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ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Mr. Young His Reasonable 
Attorneys' Fees Incurred as Consequential Damages Arising from 
Prince, Yeates' Breach of Contract 
"Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law. which 
is reviewed for correctness." Selvage v. J. J. Johnson & Associates, 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 
(Utah App. 1996). Prince, Yeates' second brief, of course, argues this court should 
affirm the trial court's order denying Mr. Young an award for his costs and attorneys' 
fees incurred in successfully proving Prince, Yeates' breach of contract. The argument 
Prince, Yeates presents to this court is the same argument made to the trial court, i.e., 
"[t]he general rule in Utah is that, subject to certain exceptions, a party is entitled to 
attorney fees only if authorized by statute or contract." Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 
959 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1998) (emphasis supplied). Mr. Young does not dispute the 
general rule in Utah or the fact no statute or contract authorizes his recovery of attorneys' 
fees here. Mr. Young does, however, contend that Prince, Yeates refuses to concede 
these facts, under Utah law, give rise to the certain exceptions* and Mr. Young may 
recover attorneys' fees although no statute or contract so states.2 
1
 Prince, Yeates retreats, only briefly, from its failure to concede this exception, 
noting "it may be argued that Heslop [v. Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992)] was 
wrongly decided and should be abandoned...." Prince, Yeates' second brief at 18. 
2
 As explained below, when an insured proves an insurer's breach of the insurance 
contract, "the insured [is] entitled to attorney fees incurred in suing its insurer for breach 
of contract even though there [is] no contractual provision or statute requiring attorney 
fees. The . . . award of attorney fees [is] a consequential damage flowing from breach of 
1 
1. The Trial Court's Initial Reaction That the First Party 
Insurance Contract Cases and Heslop v. Bank of Utah Were 
"Fully Applicable" to Mr. Young's Claims for Breach of His 
Employment Contract 
At trial, Judge Bohling first reached the conclusion that Mr. Young now asks 
this court to reach. Responding to Prince, Yeates' argument that Mr. Young had asked 
the court "to read an attorneys' fee provision into every contract," Judge Bohling stated: 
. . . I'm not sure. . . . I think it is read into employment contracts and 
the language of the Supreme Court on the Heslop case on the bottom 
of 840 and page 841 of that case, I think, makes it clear the rationale 
for allowing attorneys' fees as recoverable damages within the 
contemplation of the parties in the first-party insurance claims is 
also applicable to employment claims. Terminated employees, as he 
points out Heslop there resigned and Mr. Young resigned. They 
both resigned because of their inability to get what they were 
entitled to from their employers. . . . 
/ think that the Supreme Court has said that, in the context of 
employment cases, the rationale of the insurance cases allowing 
attorneys fees to be recovered if they're a foreseeable consequence 
[of] a breach is fully applicable. 
R. at 2025, pgs. 247-248 (emphasis supplied). Prince, Yeates' contention that, if the 
rationale for an award of attorneys' fees in the first-party insurance contract cases applied 
an insurance contract as set out in Beck and Zions. . . ." Moore v. Energy Mutual 
Insurance Co.. 814 P.2d 1141, 1147-1148 (Utah App. 1991) (emphasis supplied). This 
court recognizes "the rationale for allowing attorney fees as recoverable damages . . . in 
first party insurer claims is applicable to employment claims." Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 
839 P.2d at 840. Applying the same rationale to employment claims, when an employee 
successfully proves an employer's breach of the employment contract, the employee is 
"entitled to attorney fees incurred in suing its [employer] for breach of contract even 
though there [is] no contractual provision or statute requiring attorney fees" 
2 
here, it "would eviscerate the general rule" and lead to a situation where "attorney fees 
would be awarded virtually every time a party is found in breach of contract," is a gross 
exaggeration. The decisions of this court limit the recovery of attorneys' fees to those 
who prove claims for breach of (1) first-party insurance contracts; (2) employment 
contracts; and (3) construction contracts "where the plaintiff incurred attorney fees in 
defending against liens which arose out of the contractor's failure to pay its 
subcontractors." Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 468, n.4 (Utah 
1996). This court has "expressed] no opinion as to whether attorney fees are 
recoverable as consequential damages in other [breach of contract] contexts." id-
2. The Trial Court's Reversal of Course and Subsequent Rejection 
of Mr. Young's Position on the Attorneys' Fee Issue 
Despite Judge Bohling's initial favorable reaction to Mr. Young's position, he 
subsequently reversed himself, on the attorneys' fee issue, and sustained Prince, Yeates' 
objection. Prince, Yeates ultimately persuaded him (and, on this appeal, attempts to 
persuade this court) to restrict the application ofHeslop to "terminated employees." 
Prince, Yeates further successfully persuaded him to distinguish Mr. Heslop's resignation 
from Mr. Young's resignation, arguing Mr. Heslop's resignation was, in reality, a 
"termination" that permitted his recovery of attorneys' fees while Mr. Young's 
resignation was not!3 R. at 2025, pgs. 244-246. Denying Mr. Young the opportunity to 
3
 Notably, a "termination" vs. "resignation" analysis is wholly irrelevant to the 
rationale behind an attorneys' fee award in the first-party insurance contract cases. Since 
3 
present these rather apparent questions of fact to the jury, Judge Bohling concluded, as a 
matter of law, that Mr. Heslop's resignation was a de facto termination or constructive 
that same rationale gives rise to Mr. Young's attorneys' fee claim herein, why should a 
"termination" vs. "resignation" analysis, which is irrelevant there, determine the issue 
here? Moreover, Mr. Heslop resigned under circumstances very similar to Mr. Young. 
. . . [On October 5, 1983, Mr. Heslop] wrote a letter of resignation and 
delivered it to [his supervisor at the bank]. The letter began, "At your 
request, I am submitting in writing my notice of resignation. . . ." 
. . . After Heslop returned home, he received a[] call from [his 
supervisor]. [The supervisor] said that the Board had agreed to a hearing at 
9 a.m. on October 6, the following morning. At that meeting, Heslop 
spoke to the Board. He requested a response to the issues raised in his 
October 3, 1983 letter to the directors. He said that he would continue 
employment with the Bank so long as he received a reasonable assignment. 
. . . The directors asked no questions and made no comments after Heslop 
spoke. They sent him a letter dated October 6, 1983, which stated that 
Heslop had resigned and the Board had accepted the resignation. 
Heslop, 839 P.2d at 835. The similarities between the resignations in Heslop and here 
are several. As noted above, Mr. Heslop "requested a response to the issues raised in his 
October 3, 1983 letter to the directors." Mr. Young's July 2, 1999-memo to Prince, 
Yeates' Board of Directors (Trial exhibit 29) requested an "answer to each of the items 
requested in my June 15 memo.. . ." Mr. Heslop was willing to "continue employment 
with the Bank so long as he received a reasonable assignment." Mr. Young's memo (Id.) 
indicated "I have, all in all, enjoyed being here and would like to stay. However, that, of 
course, is largely contingent upon feeling that I am contributing something worthwhile 
and being fairly treated and rewarded for that contribution." And finally, the language of 
Mr. Young's memo (Id.), in connection with the resignation, is clearly contingent on 
Prince Yeates' refusal to deal fairly with him. " . . . I will leave the firm, effective July 
16, 1999, if we are unable to agree on an equitable distribution of the fee, and my status 
and future here." It was Prince Yeates' refusal to deal fairly with Mr. Young that caused 
the parties to go their separate ways, a de facto termination or constructive discharge. 
4 
discharge while Mr. Young's resignation was not.4 [R. at 2026, Pg. 425]. The trial court 
4
 "A 'constructive discharge' . . . occurs when an employer 'deliberately makes an 
employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an 
involuntary resignation.'" Spence v. Maryland Casualty Co.. 995 F.2d 1147, 1156 (2d 
Cir.1993) (other citations omitted). Whether a constructive discharge has occurred turns 
on the question whether "any reasonable employee would have resigned under the 
circumstances . . . , a question more appropriately answered by a trier of fact." Piech v. 
Arthur Andersen & Co., S.C.. 841 F.Supp. 825, 833 (N.D. Ill 1994) (emphasis supplied). 
Compare Sheikh v. Department of Public Safety. 904 P.2d 1103, 1107 (Utah App. 1995) 
("working conditions that a reasonable person would view as intolerable," i.e., a 
condition that leads to "involuntary or coerced resignation is equivalent to a discharge"). 
". . . [Constructive discharge occurs when an employer makes conditions 
so intolerable that an employee reasonably feels compelled to resign." 
(Citations omitted). . . .The constructive discharge doctrine enables an 
employee to recover in a suit brought against his or her employer, although 
the employer did not technically fire the particular employee. This doctrine 
has been applied to suits which involve the alleged breach of an 
employment contract. (Citations omitted). 
Epps v. NCNB Texas Nat. Bank. 838 F.Supp. 296, 304 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (emphasis 
supplied). "Constructive discharge occurs when an employer forces an employee to quit 
by deliberately imposing intolerable working conditions that would cause a reasonable 
person to resign. A reduction in pay combined with the elimination of substantial 
employment benefits like sales overrides may constitute such hardship and, combined 
with evidence of deliberate intent, establish constructive discharge." Hogan v. 
MetromaiL 107 F.Supp.2d 459, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
Does Prince, Yeates sincerely contend its refusal to pay $280,000, in breach of 
Mr. Young's employment contract, was a tolerable working condition? Does Prince, 
Yeates contend the law expected Mr. Young to remain employed while he (successfully) 
sued his employer for breach of his employment contract? Here, the question is simply 
whether Prince, Yeates' breach of contract, and the concomitant requirement that Mr. 
Young enforce that contract through litigation, gave rise to an intolerable working 
condition that would cause a reasonable person to resign. If so, Prince, Yeates 
terminated Mr. Young and the Heslop rationale, even under Prince, Yeates' 
interpretation thereof, applies. 
5 
made a complete about-face, declined to instruct the jury that Mr. Young could recover 
attorneys' fees as consequential damages, and rejected, as moot, proposed instruction No. 
26. The Court was unwilling to instruct that there is any separate damage recoverable for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. R. at 2025, pgs. 254-255. 
3. The Rationale for Awarding Attorneys' Fees in First Party 
Insurance Contract Cases Has Full Application Here as this 
Court Recognized in Heslop v. Bank of Utah 
As a starting point5 in this breach of contract case, under Utah law "[i]t is a 
well-established legal precept that when a party breaches a contract, that party is liable to 
the non-breaching party for the amount necessary to place the non-breaching party in as 
good a position as if the contract had been performed." Christiansen v. Holiday 
Rent-A-Can 845 P.2d 1316, 1320 (Utah 1992), citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§§ 344, 347 (1981). If Prince, Yeates had performed, Mr. Young would have received 
his "fair" portion of the Krause fee with (1) no requirement to pay the attorneys' fees 
now due Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic & Savage for their assistance in proving Prince, 
Yeates' breach of contract; (2) no requirement to spend approximately $123,000 of Mr. 
Young's own time (as outlined in a detailed billing provided to the trial court (R. at 
5
 The court may recall that, in Mr. Young's initial brief, Mr. Young found himself 
compelled to devote (1) 33 pages to demonstrating Prince, Yeates' failures to marshall 
the evidence and to a recitation of the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict in his favor; and (2) 14 pages to the arguments raised on Prince, Yeates' 
initial appeal. That, of course, left Mr. Young 3 pages (within the 50 page limit) to 
address the issues raised on his cross-appeal, which he did only briefly recognizing he 
would have an additional 25 pages in this Reply Brief to cover the issues in more detail. 
6 
1897-1910)) to prove Prince, Yeates' breach of contract; and (3) no requirement to spend 
approximately $152,000 of Mr. Young's own time (as outlined in a detailed billing 
provided to the trial court (R. at 1912-1930)) litigating the Mountain West Helicopters' 
case. Thus, "the amount necessary to place [Mr. Young] in as good a position as if the 
contract had been performed" is the amount of his "fair" compensation, plus an 
indemnity for the foregoing obligations that, but for Prince, Yeates' breach, he would not 
have incurred.6 
Utah law recognizes Mr. Young's entitlement to the attorneys' fees he seeks as 
consequential damages arising from Prince, Yeates' breach of contract. "In Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracey„7 this court interpreted consequential damages to allow attorney 
fees in a first-party insurance claim.8 The rationale for allowing attorney fees as 
recoverable damages within the contemplation of the parties in first-party insurance 
claims is also applicable to employment claims." Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d at 
840 (footnotes in original). Utah law also recognizes: 
6
 As noted below, Mr. Young also claims entitlement to prejudgement or 
"forbearance" interest for the time Prince, Yeates denied Mr. Young his "fair" 
compensation under the contract of employment. Accordingly, Mr. Young submits his 
full measure of damages is (1) the amount of his fair compensation; (2) prejudgment or 
"forbearance" interest on that amount; and (3) an indemnity for the attorneys * fees of 
Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic & Savage and of Mr. Young himself incurred in litigating this 
matter, both in the trial court and on appeal, and the Mountain West Helicopters matter. 
7781P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). 
8
 Id. at 420. 
7 
"As a general rule, legal damages serve the important purpose of 
compensating an injured party for actual injury sustained, so that 
[]he may be restored, as nearly as possible, to the position []he was 
in prior to the injury." Castillo v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 939 P.2d 1204, 
1209 (Utah App.1997) (citing 25 C.J.S. Damages §§1,3 (1966). 
Typically, there are two types of damages a non-breaching party can 
recover in an action for breach of contract: "general damages, which 
flow naturally from the breach, and consequential damages, which, 
while not an invariable result of breach, were reasonably foreseeable 
by the parties at the time the contract was entered into." Id. (citing 
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985)). 
To recover consequential damages, a non-breaching party must 
prove (1) that consequential damages were caused by the contract 
breach; (2) that consequential damages ought to be allowed because 
they were foreseeable at the time the parties contracted; and (3) the 
amount of consequential damages within a reasonable certainty. Id. 
(citing Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 12.3, at 
798 (1973))...; Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 
466 (Utah 1996) (stating that consequential damages are limited to 
those reasonably foreseeable or contemplated by the parties when 
contract was entered into); Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 
840-41 (Utah 1992) (same); Beck. 701 P.2d at 801 (same). 
Mahmood v. Ross. 990 P.2d 933, 937-938 (Utah 1999). Notably, in Mahmood. this 
court relied on Beck and Heslop for the proposition that where a breach of contract 
occurs, consequential damages include those damages reasonably foreseeable or 
contemplated by the parties when the contract was entered into. In Zions First Nat'1 
Bank v. National Am.Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988), this Court also relied on 
Beck to conclude "[d]amages for breach of this implied covenant [of good faith and fair 
dealing] can include consequential damages. (Citations omitted). Attorney fees incurred 
by an insured in suing its insurer because of such a breach would be recoverable 
8 
consequential damages because they plainly are reasonably foreseeable by the parties at 
the time the contract is made." Zions, 749 P.2d at 657 (emphasis supplied), quoting 
Beck, 701P.2dat801.9 
Understanding the rationale behind attorneys' fee awards as consequential 
damages for breach of Mr. Young's employment claim, begins with an understanding of 
(1) the rationale for attorneys' fee awards in first-party insurance claims and (2) how 
and/or why that rationale applies to employment claims. Several reported decisions 
address the former issue, but few address the latter. Mr. Young, therefore, attempts first 
to pinpoint the rationale for allowing recovery of attorney fees in first-party insurance 
claims and second to demonstrate how that rationale applies in these circumstances. 
The Court of Appeals describes Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 
P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am.Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 
651 (Utah 1988) and Canyon Country Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989) as "a 
trilogy of Utah Supreme Court holdings which attempts to define the peculiar 
9
 During the jury instructions conference, Prince, Yeates' counsel, Mr. Eckersley, 
conceded "that breach of contract is also a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing," [R. at 2025, Pg. 242] and "if you expressly breach a contract, you would have 
obviously breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing." [R. at 2025, Pg. 246]. 
This concession, among other things, led the Court to conclude their existed no separate 
cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, i.e., the 
claim for breach of the implied covenant was included in the claim for breach of express 
contract. [R. at 2026, Pg. 421-422]. Thus, the jury's finding that Prince, Yeates 
breached an express contract is also a finding of breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing justifying an award of attorneys' fees to Mr. Young. 
9 
characteristics of insurance contracts." Collier v. Heinz, 827 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App. 
1992). The decisions in Beck, Zions and Canyon Country Store, and a more recent 
decision in Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996), set forth the 
rationale for awarding attorneys' fees as consequential damages in first-party insurance 
claims. 
Beck first recognized that Utah law "left an insured without any effective 
remedy against an insurer that refuses to bargain or settle in good faith with the insured." 
701 P.2d at 798. Under the same rationale followed in Beck, Utah law also leaves "an 
[employee] without any effective remedy against an [employer] that refiises to bargain or 
settle in good faith10 with the [employee]."11 Since, as a general rule, both insurers and 
10
 The evidence of Prince, Yeates' failure to bargain or settle in good faith can be 
described with a recitation of just three events. In July 1999 Prince, Yeates offered Mr. 
Young $50,000, in return for a release of all claims, to settle. In October 2000, at a 
court-ordered mediation, Prince, Yeates "improved" the offer to $25,000! And now, 
even after the jury has awarded Mr. Young $280,000 as his fair compensation, Prince, 
Yeates' best offer of settlement is $250,000. In other words, now that trial is over, 
Prince, Yeates, for the first time, offers to pay Mr. Young the very amount he offered to 
accept, in full settlement, before he incurred any of his current litigation costs and 
attorneys fees! 
11
 Mr. Young notes that when either an insurer or an employer breaches the 
contract of insurance or the contract of employment, both the insured and the employee 
have available to them the same breach of contract remedy. A successful breach of 
contract claim effectively restores the losses suffered under the contract, however, it is 
ineffective to make the insured or the employee "whole" unless it allows the insured and 
the employee, upon successfully recovering their due, to also recover their reasonable 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred. This Court recognizes, when correctly awarded 
"contract damages would have made the plaintiff whole. . . ." Leigh Furniture and 
Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 309 (Utah 1982). Compare Consolidation Coal Co. v. 
Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 886 P.2d 514, 528, n. 23 (Utah 1994) ("The State 
10 
employers have far greater resources than an insured or an employee, "[t]he temptation 
for an insurer [or an employer] to delay settlement while pressures build on the insured 
[or the employee] is great, especially if the insurer's [or the employer's] exposure cannot 
exceed the policy limits," i.e., the original contract obligation. Thus, "an insured [and an 
employee] should be provided with a remedy" for such conduct.12 701 P.2d at 798. 
Choosing between a tort remedy and a contract remedy, the Beck Court 
concluded "the tort approach adopted by . . . [many] courts is without a sound theoretical 
foundation and has the potential for distorting well-established principles of contract 
law." Beck, 701 P.2d at 799. Hence, "in a first-party relationship between an insurer 
and its insured [as could equally be said of the first-party relationship between an 
is entitled to be made "whole," that is, to recover what it would have . . . if Consol had 
[not breached the contract].") Hence, this Court's conclusion that Utah law "le[aves] an 
insured [or an employee] without any effective remedy against an insurer [or an 
employer] that refuses to bargain or settle in good faith with the insured [or the 
employee]" can only have reference to the successful breach of contract claim that 
excludes the ability to recover consequential attorney fees and costs. 
12
 For example, if the insured or the employee makes a claim (say for $250,000 as 
Mr. Young did here) and the insurer or the employer rejects or otherwise fails to bargain 
or settle the claim in good faith (as Prince, Yeates did here), the insured's or the 
employee's only choice, if it believes in the claim (as Mr. Young did here), is to hire a 
lawyer and sue for breach of the contract. If successful, the insured or the employee then 
recovers the original contract obligation (say $280,000 as Mr. Young did here), however, 
now the amount the insured or the employee should have had before ever having to hire a 
lawyer is substantially reduced by the cost to obtain it, i.e., by the attorneys' fees incurred 
by the insured or the employee. If the insurer's or the employer's only exposure is for the 
original contract obligation, i.e., the policy limits in the insurer's case or the amount of 
Mr. Young's "fair" compensation here, the temptation for an insurer or an employer to 
delay settlement while pressures build on the insured or the employee is great. An 
insured and an employee should be provided with a remedy for such conduct! 
11 
employer and its employee], the duties and obligations of the parties are contractual 
rather than fiduciary." Beck, 701 P.2d at 800.13 However, a broad range of "tort-type" 
damages exists for breach of these contractual duties and obligations. 
Damages recoverable for breach of contract include both general 
damages, i.e., those flowing naturally from the breach, and 
consequential damages, i.e., those reasonably within the 
contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the 
time the contract was made. (Citations omitted). We have 
repeatedly recognized that consequential damages for breach of 
contract may reach beyond the bare contract terms. 
Beck, 701 P.2d at 801. Relying on Beck, in Zions this Court noted the consequential or 
"tort-type" damages approach contemplates recovery of attorneys' fees. "Attorney fees 
incurred by an insured in suing its insurer . . . would be recoverable consequential 
damages because they plainly are reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time the 
contract is made." Zions, 749 P.2d at 657, quoting Beck, 701 P.2d at 801. 
In Zions, the court recognized tha t . . . a court could award 
consequential damages such as attorney fees incurred in suing the 
insurer as such fees "plainly are reasonably foreseeable by the 
parties at the time the contract is made." Zions, 749 P.2d at 657.. . . 
In Canyon Country, the court concluded that the insured was 
entitled to attorney fees incurred in suing its insurer for breach of 
contract even though there was no contractual provision or statute 
requiring attorney fees. The court recognized the award of attorney 
fees as a consequential damage flowing from breach of an insurance 
contract as set out in Beck and Zions. . . . 
13
 Additional ammunition for Mr. Young's argument, opposing Prince, Yeates' 
forfeiture claim, that "in a . . . relationship between an [employer] and its [employee], the 
duties and obligations of the parties are contractual rather than fiduciary." 
12 
Moore v. Energy Mutual Insurance Co., 814 P.2d 1141, 1147-1148 (Utah App. 1991) 
(emphasis supplied). 
In Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996), this Court 
did three additional things relevant to this dispute. First, the court elaborated on the 
rationale behind the broader range, i.e., the "tort-type" rather than the "contract-type," of 
damages. 
The Beck court observed that although it had rejected the tort 
approach, the measure of damages that the law made available for 
breach of the implied covenant should "not ignor[e] the principal 
reason for [other courts'] adoption of the [otherwise theoretically 
unsound] tort approach," i.e., to remove any incentive for insurers to 
breach the duty of good faith by expanding their exposure to 
damages caused by such a breach beyond the predictable fixed 
dollar amount of coverage provided by the policy. (Citations 
omitted). In furtherance of this purpose, we departed from the 
restrictive traditional contract damages approach and followed a 
course more closely aligned with a tort damages approach. The 
Beck court concluded that a first-party insurer who breaches the 
implied covenant by unreasonably denying the insured the benefits 
bargained for may be held liable for broad consequential damages 
foreseeably caused by the breach, damages which . . . would be 
closely analogous to those available in states taking a tort approach. 
Id. at 466 (alterations in original). Since, under Utah law, the same rationale for allowing 
attorney fees as recoverable damages within the contemplation of the parties in first-party 
insurance claims also applies to employment claims, then it must also be an objective of 
Utah law "to remove any incentive for [employers] to breach the duty of good faith by 
expanding their exposure to damages caused by such a breach beyond the predictable 
fixed dollar amount of [the original contract obligation]." Billings, 918 P.2d at 466. An 
13 
"[employer] who breaches the implied covenant by unreasonably denying [an employee] 
the benefits bargained for may be held liable for broad consequential damages 
foreseeably caused by the breach, damages which . . . would be closely analogous to 
those available in states taking a tort approach" and include consequential attorneys' 
fees. id. 
Second, in Billings this Court also clarified that consequential damages, 
including attorney fees, flowing from the breach of an insurance contract are available 
not just for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but also for 
breach of the express terms of the contract.14 Citing Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 
781 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah 1989), Billings recognized "[a]ttorney fees may be recoverable 
as consequential damages flowing from an insurer's breach of either the express or the 
impliedterms of an insurance contract." Billings at 468 (emphasis supplied). Here then, 
to justify an award of attorneys' fees under the first-party insurance contract rationale, as 
explained in Billings, the jury need only conclude that Prince, Yeates breached either the 
express or the implied terms of Mr. Young's employment contract. It did just that! 
And finally, consistent with this same notion, Billings recognizes an insurer 
(and an employer) can violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing without 
14
 Again, Billings is consistent with the acknowledgments of Mr. Eckersley, "that 
breach of contract is also a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing," R. at 
2025, p. 242, and "if you expressly breach a contract, you would have obviously 
breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing." R. at 2025, p. 246. 
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engaging in bad faith. Billings, 918 P.2d at 465, n. 2. This court reaffirmed the same 
concept four years after Billings. 
Typically, an award of attorney fees may be made "if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was [i] without 
merit and [ii] not brought or asserted in good faith." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-56 (1999). The second part of this test drops out, 
however, in first-party insurer actions. See Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. 
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 949 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997). 
Attorney fees may be awarded where a breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, inherent in every insurance 
contract, has occurred. See id. It is unnecessary to show bad faith 
in proving a breach of the covenant. See Billings v. Union Bankers 
Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 465 n. 2 (Utah 1996). 
Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Center, Inc., 15 P.3d 1030, 1037 (Utah 2000). 
Paraphrasing the Utah Court of Appeals in Pugh v. North American Warranty 
Services, Inc., 1 P.3d 570 (Utah App. 2000), the essence of Mr. Young's position is 
simply this: "[Prince Yeates'] refusal to pay . . . resulted in foreseeable and provable 
consequential damages to [Mr. Young], including the attorney fees he had to incur in an 
ultimately successful effort to recover his due." Id. at 575, citing Zions, 749 P.2d at 657. 
Prince, Yeates compelled Mr. Young to endure a lengthy discovery process, four motions 
for summary judgment (one of which Mr. Young filed as a cross-motion in response to 
Prince, Yeates' own filing), a petition for interlocutory appeal, a motion for directed 
verdict, trial and now this appeal. With the exception of this, as yet, undecided appeal, 
Mr. Young has prevailed, on the breach of contract claim, at every step of the way. 
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Without some consequence for its refusal, beginning in September 1999 when 
the Krause fee first came in and continuing to the present, to bargain or settle with Mr. 
Young in good faith, and some consequence for its intransigent course of conduct in this 
litigation, Prince, Yeates and every other employer will follow the same strategy, i.e., 
delay settlement while pressures build on the employee. If it costs no more than the 
original contract obligation (now sitting in a joint escrow account), why not make it as 
difficult as possible for the employee with an extended discovery process, four motions 
for summary judgment, a petition for interlocutory appeal, a motion for directed verdict, 
trial and now this appeal, all intended to deprive Mr. Young of any part of the fee or to 
consume all of his award in attorney fees? This is exactly what Prince Yeates has done 
and is continuing to do. 
Why not? The answer lies in Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 
(Utah 1989), relying on Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d at 798, which "recognized 
that all contracts contain a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. . . . This includes . . . 
employment contracts." Berube, 771 P.2d at 1046. The breach of that covenant, which, 
as Prince, Yeates concedes, occurs ipso facto in the case of a breach of express contract, 
exposes the insurer or the employer to claims for a broad range of recoverable damages 
including consequential damages incurred in the form of attorneys' fees. 
Beck envisioned a broad range of recoverable damages for breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a first-party insurance 
contract. Similarly, Berube envisioned a broad range of recoverable 
damages in an implied-in-fact contract of employment, including 
16 
both general and consequential damages. In Berube, we stated that 
"consequential damages are 'those reasonably within the 
contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the 
time the contract was made."'15 
Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d at 840 (footnote in original). "Attorney fees incurred 
by an [employee] in suing its [employer] because of such a breach would be recoverable 
consequential damages because they plainly are reasonably foreseeable by the parties at 
the time the contract is made." Zions, 749 P.2d at 657. Accordingly, "[u]nder our 
holdings in Berube and Beck . . . the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on 
the availability of consequential damages, including attorney fees, in plaintiffs 
employment suit." Heslop, 839 P.2d at 841. The trial court committed the same error 
here. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Mr. Young Prejudgment (or 
Forbearance) Interest under Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 
"A trial court's decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a 
question of law which [this court] review[s] for correctness." Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 
P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995). Relying upon a Utah Court of Appeals decision, 
Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.. 848 P.2d 171 (Utah App.1993), Prince, Yeates 
contends a prejudgment interest award, under Utah law, requires that Mr. Young's 
damages 
Berube. 771 P.2d at 1050 (quoting Beck. 701 P.2d at 801). 
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must be calculable through a mathematically certain procedure 
allowing the court or jury to fix the amount following "fixed rules of 
evidence and known standards of value . . . rather than be[ing] 
guided by their best judgment in assessing the amount" or 
evaluating elements lacking fixed standards by which to measure 
their value. 
Andreason, 848 P.2d at 177. Prince, Yeates argues Mr. Young had "no evidence . . . 
regarding a mathematical formula by which damages could be ascertained" and, hence, 
"cannot now be heard to argue that such amount was ascertained with 'mathematical 
accuracy.'" Prince, Yeates' second brief at 19-20.16 Neither Andreason, nor this court's 
16
 In the trial court Prince, Yeates argued (and Judge Bohling accepted the 
argument) that "Mr. Young's claims for compensation were unliquidated" and, thus, 
"Mr. Young is not entitled to any prejudgment interest." R. at 1987. Remarkably, 
Prince, Yeates now abandons that position altogether and the word "unliquidated" does 
not appear in Prince, Yeates' second brief. Prince, Yeates abandons the argument with 
good reason. More than twenty-five years ago this court recognized "[w]hile the rule is 
sometimes stated that interest cannot be recovered on unliquidated damages, the 
tendency of the more modern cases is to allow interest...." Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. 
White Superior Co.. 546 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1976). 
. . . [Therefore, where the damage is complete, and the amount of the loss 
is fixed as of a particular time, there is—there can be—no reason why 
interest should be withheld merely because the damages are unliquidated. 
There are certain cases of unliquidated damages where interest cannot be 
allowed. In all personal injury cases, cases of death by wrongful act, libel, 
slander, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault and battery, and 
all cases where the damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the 
province of the jury to assess at the time of the trial, no interest is 
permissible. But this is so because the damages are continuing and may 
even reach beyond the time of trial. 
Id. (emphasis supplied), quoting Fell v. Union Pacific Rv. Co.. 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003 
(1907) ("By being awarded legal interest. . . , [the prevailing party] is simply placed in 
statu quo, and nothing short of this is full compensation, and that is just what the law 
18 
decision in Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379 (Utah 1995), requires Mr. Young to present 
evidence of a "mathematical formula" by which damages can be ascertained. 
The law on this [prejudgment interest] issue is clear: 
[W]here the damage is complete and the amount of the loss 
is fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be measured 
by facts and figures, interest should be allowed from that time 
. . . and not from the date of judgment Canyon Country 
Store v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989) (alterations 
in original) (quoting First Sec. Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. 
Feedvards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591, 600 (Utah 1982)); see also 
Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991). 
Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d at 1387 (emphasis supplied). Prince, Yeates does not dispute 
the fact Mr. Young's loss was fixed at a particular time. The Krause fee was available 
for distribution in September 1999 and, at that moment, Mr. Young was entitled to "fair" 
compensation under his contract of employment. The jury concluded Prince, Yeates' 
refusal to pay "fair" compensation was a breach of that contract. "Section 15-1-1(1) 
[Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) now redesignated section 15-1-1(2)] establishes the 
aims to accomplish. Is it an answer to say that the damages are unliquidated, and 
therefore interest is not to be allowed? This, to our minds, is no reason at all in case of 
injury.. . ." 88 P. at 1005-1006). This is not a case of personal injury, death by wrongful 
act, libel, slander, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution or assault and battery. Nor 
is this a case where the damages are incomplete and peculiarly within the province of the 
jury to assess at the time of the trial because they are continuing and may even reach 
beyond the time of trial. In this breach of contract case, the court must reject the 
"unliquidated" damages rationale followed by the trial court to deny Mr. Young 
prejudgment interest. 
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legal rate of prejudgment interest in a breach of contract as 10 percent per annum." 
Nielsen v. O'Reilly. 848 P.2d 664, 669-670 (Utah 1992) (emphasis supplied).17 
Prince, Yeates does, however, argue that because it was up to the jury to 
determine Mr. Young's "fair" compensation, this is not the kind of case where the loss 
"can be measured by facts and figures" and, therefore, a prejudgment interest award 
cannot be made.18 Mr. Young acknowledges the jury's task was to determine the "fair" 
compensation to which he was entitled under his contract of employment. Nevertheless, 
the suggestion that Mr. Young's loss was not measured or measurable by facts and 
17
 Citing Canyon Country Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989), Prince, 
Yeates attempts to persuade this court that it does not award prejudgment interest in 
breach of contract cases. Prince, Yeates' second brief at 20. Canyon Country argued 
"the trial court erred in denying it prejudgment interest on attorney fees and the loss of 
profits in [its] grocery and trucking businesses." Id- On appeal, this court disallowed 
lost profits awarded for the trucking business, rendering moot the issue as to prejudgment 
interest on that award. Id- As to the request for an award of prejudgment interest on 
Canyon Country's attorney fees and lost profits in the grocery business, it should be 
evident that such damages are "are continuing and may even reach beyond the time of 
triair Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1976) 
(emphasis supplied). Thus, this court appropriately characterized Canyon Country's 
damages "as analogous to damages awarded in wrongful death or defamation cases," 
Canyon Country, 781 P.2d at 422, and declined to reverse the trial court's failure to 
award prejudgment interest. Prince, Yeates cites no case, because no case exists, 
where this court rejected a prejudgment interest award for "the opposing party's 
delay in tendering the amount owing under. . . a valid contract determined to have 
been breached by the other party." Vasels v. LoGuidice. 740 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Utah 
App. 1987). 
18
 Implicit in Prince, Yeates' argument, of course, is the notion that Mr. Young, 
the prevailing party, should get none of the approximately $90,000 interest accrued in the 
parties' joint Fidelity Investments account and Prince, Yeates, the party in breach of 
contract, should take all of that interest presumably as its reward for breach of contract! 
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figures is utter nonsense.19 Moreover, the fact the determination of "fair" compensation 
was up to the jury is no basis for rejecting a prejudgment interest award. 
This court's eminent domain cases, where prejudgment interest is awarded 
from the time the condemnor takes possession of the property until the court or jury 
determines the "fair" market value thereof, at trial, illustrate the error of Prince, Yeates' 
argument. In San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co. v. Board of Education of Salt Lake City, 
99 P. 263 (Utah 1909), the jury determined (1) the "fair" market value of property taken 
by the railroad and (2) the depreciation in value of a second piece of property, caused by 
the railroad's "taking" of the first piece located nearby. The parties agreed the property 
taken was worth $250, but could not agree on the devaluation of the property not taken. 
. . . The court submitted the question of damages to the jury, and left 
it to them to determine how much the value of the property not taken 
was depreciated by reason of the [taking]. . . . The jury found the 
value of the strip taken, by consent of both parties, to be $250, and 
against such consent found the depreciation of the value of the 
property not taken to be $2,500. . . . After the verdict... the court 
computed interest at the legal rate upon the whole amount, to wit, 
$2,750 from the date [the Railroad] took possession of the 
condemned strip and entered judgment accordingly. After . . . 
19
 The jury measured Mr. Young's $280,000 loss of "fair" compensation by 
comparing facts and figures including (1) the $641,548 Krause fee; (2) the proposed 1/3 
- 2/3 division outlined in Mr. Chindlund's May 5, 1999-memorandum; (3) the 
$1,086,296 in legal fees (including the Krause fee) Mr. Young generated at Prince, 
Yeates; (4) the approximately $300,000 Prince, Yeates paid Mr. Young (excluding the 
jury award) in W-2 compensation and (5) other facts and figures, relating to 
performance, that Mr. Young and Prince, Yeates' office manager, Ron Mangone, 
testified to regarding the legal fees generated by and the W-2 compensation paid to other 
Prince, Yeates' attorneys. 
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appeal. . . by [the Board of Education] . . . the [Railroad] served and 
filed [its] assignment of cross-error, alleging that the court erred in 
awarding judgment for interest upon the $2,500 damages.... It is 
contended that this case falls within the class of cases where interest 
cannot be allowed until after verdict and judgment. 
. . . In this case the damages had to be ascertained by a legal 
standard or measure, and in accordance with fixed rules of evidence. 
The amount of damages the [Board of Education] was entitled to 
recover, and what the jury permitted it to recover, was the 
diminution of the value of the property when used for school 
purposes which was caused by the construction and operation of the 
railroad... . We, therefore, have a case in which, for the purpose of 
fixing damages, the injury is complete; the damages are ascertained 
by the ordinary rules of evidence and according to a known 
standard or measure of value. And all this must be determined from 
competent evidence, which is binding upon both the court and jury. 
The jury, therefore, only had a right to exercise their judgment 
within the limits of the evidence upon the question of value. It is not 
a case where it was left to the jury to determine the amount of 
damages from a mere description of the wrongs done or injuries 
inflicted whether to person, property or reputation. [The railroad's] 
cross-error, therefore, cannot be sustained, and the judgment 
[including the prejudgment interest award] must be affirmed. 
Id. at 266-267, also citing Fell v. Union Pacific (emphasis supplied). 
Here too, although Mr. Young and Prince, Yeates disagreed on the amount of 
the "fair" compensation to which Mr. Young was entitled, the injury, nevertheless, was 
complete on the date the Krause fee came in and Prince, Yeates refused to pay "fair" 
compensation. Moreover, damages, determined by the jury at trial, were ascertained by 
the ordinary rules of evidence and according to a known standard or measure of value. 
The jury did not determine the damages from a mere description of the wrongs done or 
22 
injuries inflicted. It only had a right to exercise its judgment within the limits of the 
evidence upon the question of "fair" value or "fair" compensation. 
State v. Danielson, 247 P.2d 900 (Utah 1952) is another eminent domain case 
where this court acknowledged "the legal rate of interest in this state for the forbearance 
of money is six per cent per annum. Sec. 44-0-1, U.C.A.1943. Respondents were 
entitled to interest at this rate." Id. at 223. Danielson, therefore, recovered prejudgment 
or forbearance interest from the date the State first took his property, i.e., "the date of the 
order of immediate occupancy," id. at 221, until the judge or jury determined the "fair" 
market value thereof at trial. The Supreme Court approved this result while expressly 
recognizing the order of immediate occupancy contemplated "leaving for future 
determination the amount of the damages." Id. at 222. Those damages too were 
determined by the judge or jury following the presentation of facts and figures at the time 
of trial. As the Supreme Court noted "the trial court was impressed by the testimony of 
C. Francis Solomon, an expert real estate appraiser, and relied largely upon his testimony 
in arriving at the damages sustained by the respondents." Id. at 224. 
In State v. Danielson, this court recognized "[i]n the absence of constitutional 
or statutory provision prescribing the rate of interest to which a condemnee is entitled 
from the date his property is taken . . . until the date of the award of damages, it is 
generally recognized that he is entitled to interest at the legal rate." 247 P.2d at 223 
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(emphasis supplied). Thus, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the prejudgment interest 
award (as modified to conform to Utah's then existing legal rate of forbearance interest). 
[T]he law in Utah is clear, viz: where the damage is complete 
and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and that 
loss can be measured by facts and figures, interest should be allowed 
from that time and not from the date of judgment. Bjork v. April 
Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977) (footnote omitted), cert, 
denied, 431 U.S. 930, 97 S.Ct. 2634, 53 L.Ed.2d 245 (1977). 
Prejudgment interest represents an amount awarded as damages 
due to the opposing party's delay in tendering the amount owing 
under an obligation. L & A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Constr. Co., 
608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980). In Bjork, as in numerous other 
cases declaring a party's entitlement to prejudgment interest as a 
matter of law,20 the interest accrued as damages arising out of a valid 
contract determined to have been breached by the other party. See, 
e.g., Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 1985); 
Jack B. Parson Constr. Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 107 (Utah 1976). 
Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Utah App. 1987) (footnote supplied). Mr. 
Young's "entitlement to prejudgment interest... [also] accrue[s] as damages arising out 
of a valid contract determined to have been breached by [Prince, Yeates]." Utah law 
contemplates Mr. Young's recovery of prejudgment interest, in these circumstances, and 
the trial court erred in denying the same.21 
20
 In Mont Trucking, Inc. v. Entrada Industries, Inc., 802 P.2d 779 (Utah App. 
1990), the Utah Court of Appeals, in another "action for breach of contract," id. at 780, 
recognized "[t]he trial judge . . . was required as a matter of law to award the statutorily 
mandated [prejudgment or forbearance interest] rate." Id. at 782 (emphasis supplied). 
21
 And finally, this court should understand the reality that Mr. Young actually 
generated the funds from which this court could now award his reasonable costs, 
attorneys' fees and prejudgment interest! Mr. Mangone testified the overhead at Prince, 
Yeates, per attorney, is $65,000-$67,000 per year. (R. at 2025, pg. 134). Thus, Mr. 
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With respect to the amount of prejudgment interest to which Mr. Young is 
entitled, Mr. Young notes, under Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2), "the legal rate of interest 
for the . . . forbearance of any money . . . shall be 10% per annum." In other words, the 
interest to which Mr. Young is entitled, although commonly called "prejudgment 
interest," is more accurately described as "forbearance interest." Mr. Young is entitled to 
such interest, at the rate of 10% per annum, during the period of his "forbearance of any 
money." Fell v. Union Pacific raises and then affirmatively determines that Mr. Young is 
"entitled to interest... to the date of repayment." Fell, 88 P. at 1005. 
In light of the jury's verdict, Mr. Young has been entitled to receive "fair" 
compensation, equal to the sum of $280,000, since September 1999 when the Krause fee 
first came in and the period of Mr. Young's forbearance began. That forbearance now 
continues post-judgment with the filing of Prince, Yeates' Motion for Stay of Execution 
Pending Appeal (R. at 1763) and the Trial Court's Order granting the same. Thus, on 
remand, Mr. Young seeks the Court's Order directing that his right to "forbearance" 
interest continues until Prince, Yeates "repays" Mr. Young's $280,000 loss. 
CONCLUSION 
Consistent with the foregoing law and argument, Mr. Young reiterates his 
request for this Court's Order AFFIRMING (1) the Jury's verdict and (2) the Trial 
Young's "fair" overhead, for the 51 months of his association, approximates $280,000. 
Even with the jury award, Mr. Young's contribution to Prince, Yeates' overhead 
approximates $500,000, leaving $220,000 to satisfy Mr. Young's claims! 
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Court's Orders (a) Denying Prince, Yeates' Motions for Summary and Partial Summary 
Judgment and for a Directed Verdict and (b) Granting Mr. Young's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. Mr. Young also seeks the Court's Order REVERSING the Trial 
Court's Orders Denying Mr. Young (1) his Attorneys' Fees incurred as a consequence of 
Prince, Yeates' breach of contract and (2) a Prejudgment or "Forbearance" Interest 
Award on the amount of the "fair" compensation the jury awarded him for Prince, 
Yeates' breach of contract and REMANDING to the Trial Court for determination of the 
attorneys' fees and prejudgment interest to which Mr. Young is entitled. 
DATED: November tC,2002. 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
Samuel O.GWfm (1170) 
50 South Main, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 328-2200 
Attorneys for Defendant, Counterclaim Plaintiff, Appellee 
and Cross-Appellant Robert S. Young 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1<T day of November 2002,1 caused two copies 
of Mr. Young's REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
M. David Eckersley, Esq. 
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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